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Perfect thought apprehends and thinks its object in such a way that 
the thought and its object become one, and the thought thus becomes 
its own object. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Lambda, 1072b 
Introduction: Some examples of philosophy 
I hate going to parties; or at least I hate going to parties where I don't 
know people. The reason is not a general misanthropy. It is that in 
chatting to people one is almost certain to be asked what one does; 
and unless I can change the subject, I have to admit that I am a 
philosopher. It is not that I am ashamed of being a philosopher -
quite the contrary. Rather, it is because I know what is coming next. 
If I am lucky, it is an embarrassed silence whilst the person tries to 
remember the difference between philosophy, philanthropy, psycho­
logy, physiology and similar words. If I am unlucky, they ask the 
question I really dread: what is philosophy? The question is one I 
dread since I never really know how to answer. (A fact that is likely 
to give the questioner a somewhat mistaken impression, to say the 
least.) Now it seems to me that a professor of philosophy can hardly 
rest content with this situation. An honest question deserves an hon­
est answer. The major theme in this lecture is an attempt to give one. 
In many ways, the best way to explain what philosophy is - and 
the way I resort to if pressed - is to give examples of the kinds of 
problems that philosophers tackle. For example, much is made 
today of the humble computing machine. Some have thought that 
there is, in principle, no human cognitive activity that it cannot per­
form. Indeed, some have gone so far as to suggest that people are es­
sentially such machines. Is this right? A second example: many 
have claimerl that they have a right to abortion; many others have 
claimed that they have a right to stop others having an abortion. 
Who is right; and what is all this talk of rights anyway? The nature 
of time provides a multitude of problems: would it pass if nothing 
changed, or if there were no conscious beings; and how can time it­
self, the measure of passage, itself pass. One final example will 
suffice. Many assume that democracy is the best form of govern­
ment. But why should the fact that a majority of people think that a 
person or group should govern be reason to let them? You would 
hardly want to base a medical decision on a majority decision of the 
populace; why a political decision? 
I The nature of philosophy: the search for a definition 
Examples such as these may be illuminating, but as an account of 
philosophy they leave something to be desired. Examples can indi­
cate the area which is philosophy, but they cannot specify what it is. 
To do this we need a definition. What kind of definition do we need, 
however? Following Aristotle, it has been customary to distinguish 
between real definitions and nominal definitions. Nominal defini­
tions are about language. They specify the meaning of a word or 
phrase. A standard example is: "bachelor" means an unmarried 
male of eligible age. Real definitions, by contrast, are not about lan­
guage, but are about things themselves, and specify their natures. 
For example, the definitions of the chemical elements in terms of 
their atomic numbers are real definitions. Thus, gold is the chemical 
element with atomic number 79. Notice that this hardly captures the 
meaning of the word "gold" - the word was meaningful before the 
notion of atomic number was thought of. It gives, however, a char­
acterisation of gold itself by stating its essential characteristic. 
Now in seeking a definition of philosophy we are not seeking a 
nominal definition. What the word means is of little interest. What 
we are after is a real definition, something that tells us what philoso­
phy itself is, that is, which specifies its nature. 
Though it is not a nominal definition we are after, perhaps the 
place to start to look is with the etymology of the word 
"philosophy". The Greek "philosophia", from which 
"philosophy" derives, is often translated as the love of wisdom. 
This, however, is a poor translation. The Greek "sophia" means the 
exercise of intelligence or intellectual curiosity, and can be used to 
apply to fields as widely different as cosmology and carpentry. 
Hence the etymology of the word is of little use here. 
Content or Method? 
Many philosophers have offered a definition of philosophy. The 
trouble is that they have offered many quite different definitions. 
One kind of definition that has been offered draws its rationale from 
some philosophical theory or other. Thus, for example, Plato identi­
fied philosophy with a study of the Forms, and Hegal thought it was 
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a certain phase in the development of Geist. The problem with these 
definitions is not so much that the theories on which they are based 
are false - though they are that - as that a definition of a subject 
should not presuppose any substantive theory within the subject it­
self. We would not accept a definition of "physics", for example, 
which enshrined a particular conception of matter (be it particles, 
waves or the Aristotelian elements). Rather, physics is the study of 
matter, whatever that should turn out to be. In a similar way, a 
definition of philosophy should be theory-neutral. 
Some disciplines - such as physics - can, as I have just indicated, 
be characterised in terms of a distinctive subject matter. Some 
philosophers have thought that philosophy can be similarly defined. 
For example, the view that mind and matter are totally distinct kinds
of things grew to prominence in the eighteenth century. This sug­
gested to numerous people that matter was the domain of the physi­
cal sciences (natural philosophy) and mind was the domain of 
philosophy (moral sciences). Thus, philosophy could be defined as 
the study of the distinctively mental, i.e., of things human. Thus Mill 
in Auguste Compte and Positivism, defined philosophy as the 
scientific study of man. 
Even setting aside the chauvinism of this definition, its 
shortcomings are too obvious to need labouring. Not only is there 
much to the study of humanity which is not philosophy (as the dis­
ciplines of psychology and sociology show), but there are many 
philosophical problems that have nothing specifically to do with 
humanity. This is particularly true of philosophical problems thrown 
up by concepts in the natural sciences, such as those about time that I 
mentioned. 
Rather than define philosophy in terms of a distinctive subject­
matter, some phil�sophers have tried to define it in terms of the 
possession of a distinctive method, just as some have wanted to def­
ine science in terms of "the scientific method". The most recent 
attempt at such an account is probably the last which held any or­
thodoxy in the English-speaking philosophical world; and was to the 
effect that philosophy proceeded by" linguistic analysis". What, ex­
actly, this meant was itself a point of disagreement. (It meant, for ex­
ample, rather different things to its most notable proponents: 
Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein and Austin.) However, in nuce, the 
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central thought is that in some sense philosophical problems are 
linguistic and are to be solved by analysing the structure of discourse. 
Philosophy has learned a lot from linguistic analysis. Certainly, 
getting clear about what exactly the issues are is an essential part of 
any philosophical investigation, and the much lampooned reply "It 
depends what you mean'', is a necessary first step in many in­
vestigations. But it is, at best, only a first step. Information about 
language can not provide an answer to substantial (and clarified) 
questions about the nature of thought, time or rights, as most 
philosophers would now agree, in virtue of the fact that linguistic 
philosophy has simply failed to deliver the goods. Nor is there any 
reason to suppose that the modern continental form of this endeav­
our - deconstruction - will ultimately fare any better. I repeat: if 
you ask questions about language, you will get answers about langu­
age. If you want to answer questions about what language talks 
about, you must ask about that. 
The Theory of Criticism 
So far we have learned little about philosophy from the definitions I 
have considered. I now want to consider two others, which are also 
wrong, but from which one can learn important things. Some of 
these things I shall flag for future reference. A most interesting 
definition is offered by John Passmore in his article on the topic in 
the Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Passmore defines philosophy as the 
theory of critical discussion. What he means by this is that philo­
sophy is concerned with the analysis and evaluation of the reasons 
that are offered for positions (in science, mathematics, religion, 
morality, politics, art, or whatever). He does not mean that 
philosophers are concerned to evaluate whether the latest proof of 
Goede!' s Theorem is correct, or if tl}e' latest arguments for social 
justice hold water, though they may do that too. Rather, he means 
that philosophy is concerned with the various kinds of reasons that 
are offered for various kinds of conclusion: what exactly they are, 
how they function, and whether or not they really are good reasons. 
There are two very important aspects of philosophy that 
Passmore's account throws into prominence. The first is that philos­
ophy is essentially critical [1]. This is one of the things that dis­
tinguishes it from religion, politics and normal science (in the sense of 
T.S.Kuhn). Nothing is sacrosanct; everything is fair game for 
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challenge, must defend itself, or go under. The second aspect is that 
philosophy has a symbiotic relation with other disciplines. It draws 
many of its central issues from other areas, such as physics, psycho­
logy, law, literature etc. In return, it provides for them a critique of 
their methods, canons of argument and fundamental beliefs, which 
spur on the long-term development of those subjects. 
Despite this, I think that Passmore's account is not right. It takes 
account of what we might call the analytic side of philosophy (its 
critical and evaluative aspects), but ignores what we might call the 
synthetic side. For philosophy is also a strongly imaginative and 
creative subject [2]. Philosophers have produced some of the most 
ingenious and important theories in Western thought. Sometimes 
the theories have become, deservedly or undeservedly, mere history. 
More importantly, sometimes the theories were taken up later by 
other disciplines to provide the bases for important developments. 
Thus in science, atomism and positivism (highly important in the 
geneses of both behaviorism and the Theory'of Relativity) - to name 
but a couple from a very long list - were first developed by 
philosophers. In politics, the ideas of Hobbes, Locke and Marx have 
all been made the bases of political systems. In art, the Romantic 
movement of the nineteenth century owed much to the romantic 
philosophy of Rousseau, Coleridge and others. And so it goes on. 
Indeed Passmore himself, in a recent interview in the Bulletin (16 
May 1989) notes that "almost all the ideas we now take for granted 
came from philosophy". Passmore's definition seems to do no 
justice to this creative aspect of philosophy. 
Philosophy and the History of Western Thought 
To understand the other illuminating but incorrect account of philo­
sophy it is necessary to look at the historical development of Western 
thought. It is a striking fact that philosophy is the area out of which 
sprang nearly all the more specialised intellectual inquiries that we 
now recognise [3]; they each broke away from philosophy when they 
developed specialised methods appropriate to dealing with the ob­
jects of their inquiry. Mathematics was the first subject to break 
away in about the third century BC. (Pythagoras was as much 
philosopher as mathematician. Euclid was not.) Astronomy broke 
away about the second century AD (with Ptolemy). Physics and the 
other natural sciences broke away in the early seventeenth century (at 
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the time of Galileo and Descartes), sociology, psychology and 
economics in the nineteenth. And so it went. We are currently 
witnessing philosophy give birth to literary theory; and what subjects 
will follow is anyone's guess. (It is interesting to note that logic, 
which could have broken away at any time after the third century BC, 
has retained its central locus in philosophy despite forging allegiances 
with other disciplines. Why this is I shall not speculate.) 
This, I suppose, raises the question of whether philosophy will 
eventually wither away in favour of more specialist disciplines. Such 
an optimistic view (or maybe pessimistic - depending on who you 
are) is, I think, groundless. Human thought, creative and untidy, is 
unlikely ever to allow itself to be neatly tailored into such Pro­
crustean beds; if only because, as I have noted, the relationship 
between philosophy and the special sciences is a dialectical one, the 
sciences themselves posing new philosophical problems as they 
develop. 
Be all this as it may, this historical perspective suggests another 
definition of philosophy. In chapter I of Some Problems of Philo­
sophy William James, reviewing the development that I have just 
noted, remarks that philosophy is but the residuum of questions un­
answered. James' actual remark is wrong. There are many purely 
scientific questions that are unanswered - take your pick in quan­
tum physics, cosmology, evolutionary theory, economics; and many 
purely philosophical ones that are answered - e.g., all the traditio­
nal versions of, say, the Ontological Argumeh._t for the existence of 
God are agreed to be unsound. However, the spirit of James' remark 
seems sound: philosophical questions are those that are not within 
the scope of the methods of more specialised inquiries [4]. 
Perhaps this can provide a definition? Unfortunately not; for a 
very simple reason: as the ancient canons of definition tell us, you 
cannot define something by saying what it is not. To define some­
thing is to say what it is; no amount of saying what it is not can do 
this. (Obviously I cannot define gold by saying that it is not iron and 
not copper and not. .. ) Indeed, the fact that philosophy has given 
birth to (most) other theoretical inquiries cannot provide the basis of 
a definition of philosophy; it is a fact that itself cries out for explana­
tion, presumably in terms of the nature of philosophy. 
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II The role of philosophy in a university 
So far, then, in the search for a definition of philosophy, we have 
drawn a blank. We have already seen enough, however, for me to 
take up the secondary theme of this lecture: the role of philosophy in 
a university. I will return to the question of the nature of philosophy 
after the following interpolation. Universities have three prime 
functions and, correlatively, three prime responsibilities. I shall 
argue that philosophy is important, indeed, essential, to each of 
these. 
Research 
The first function of a university is to research; and the correlative 
responsibility is to the subject researched. There is no older academic 
subject than pl
u
losophy. This has always been a prime area of rese­
arch in universities. Moreover, it is important to remember that uni­
versities now bear the sole responsibility for research in philosophy. 
Gone are the days when either the church or private incomes pro­
vided for the livelihood of philosophers. If the universities of the 
world closed their philosophy departments, philosophy would not 
cease: the fascination of the human mind for some of the most pro­
found problems that can be posed will ever outstrip local institutional 
arrangements, but organised research into philosophy would cease. 
For this reason, if no other, universities have a responsibility to ens­
ure the existence of thriving philosophy departments. 
However, the importance of research in philosophy far outstrips 
its own local confines. As I have pointed out, historically, philo­
sophy has functioned as the mother of theoretical inquiries, giving 
birth to them all. If we wish new areas or disciplines to emerge - and 
there is no reason to smugly assume that all that can be already are -
research in philosophy is essential to provide the matrix out of which 
they may arise. 
Secondly, and again as I have already noted, even when a discipl­
'ine breaks away from philosophy, philosophy does not cease to be 
relevant to it. Fundamental problems are thrown back to philosophy 
for analysis. Philosophers are in the ideal position to perform this 
service, first, because of their training in critical scrutiny, secondly, 
because they are willing to question things which practitioners of the 
special area are not themselves prepared to question at that time, and 
thirdly, because they are prepared to suggest fruitful speculative ideas 
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that someone deeply ingrained in,the subject is unlikely to counten­
ance. The historian of science, T.S.Kuhn, observed in the Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions that philosophy has played an important 
role in all revolutions in the natural sciences. His point would be equ­
ally valid for revolutions in psychology; politics, and so on. 
Teaching 
The second function of a university is to teach; and the correlative 
responsibility is to its students. In one respect this is but a corollary 
of the previous function: you can't have research in a subject unless 
you train researchers. However, few people who are undergraduates 
at university will become researchers. What, then, are they doing 
here? 
Part of the answer is that they are here to absorb a body of in­
formation which they will then go out into the wider world and 
apply. This is only a part of the story however - and a smaller part 
that many think. If this is all there were to teaching there would be 
much more cost-effective ways of going about it. (We could create 
the battery-hen university.) The rest of the story is that universities 
should produce thoughtful, mature, rational, well-r�unded people ,
who are capable of living their lives to the full and enriching those of 
others. If someone can leave a university without having had the op­
portunity to think about the existence of God, various moral pro­
blems such as abortion, the rights and wrongs of the political system 
in which they live and the nature of the physical universe in which 
they live - in short, about philosophy - then that university has 
failed its students. In an ideal world, all students would, perhaps, 
take courses which required them to think about these problems. 
However, this is not an ideal world: time is a scarce commodity. But 
even in a less that ideal world students may attend open discussions, 
seminars, debates on these issues, provided only that they are avail­
able. And they should be available in any university worth its salt. 
Thus, philosophy should play an integral role in both the formal and 
the informal educational life of a university. 
Society 
The-third fu.nction of a university is to be the locus of certain'social 
resources; the correlative responsibility is to society. In a sense, this 
too is a corollary of the previous point. As I said there, it is a func­
tion of a university to produce people who can enrich the lives of 
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others. Doing so is precisely fulfilling ones responsibilities to society. 
This is done in many ways. I attempt no exhaustive list; but first, 
people at universities are able to help others appreciate their cultural 
heritage, be this philosophy, literature or science. Secondly, they can 
actually create such a cultural heritage. Amongst the humanities, 
philosophy is unique in this respect. Writers are rarely to be found in 
English departments, few people in music departments are com­
posers, but with few exceptions creative philosophers are to be found 
in, and only in, university philosophy departments. 
Next, people at universities have an important role to play in social 
commentary and criticism, be this through the media, government 
commissions, moves for social and legal reform, and so on. 
Philosophers have an important role to play in these things; for usu­
ally they have thought about the issues professionally and, just as im­
portantly, have no special interests to protect. Moreover, they are 
good social critics for exactly the same reasons that they are good 
critics in general: they have both highly developed critical skills and 
are prepared to float 1:ovel ideas. Of course, this may make them un­
popular sometimes - I have yet to see a government that welcomed 
criticism - which is why the independence of the universities from 
outside power groups, most notably the government, fs absolutely 
crucial in fulfilling this social role. 
Notice that I have not yet used the words "national interest". This 
is quite deliberate. The social responsibilities of a university go far 
beyond the parochial considerations of the nation that houses it. The 
kinds of responsibility I have mentioned above are to all humanity. 
National governments are, of course, agents whose function is pre­
"cisely to protect national interests - another reason why universities 
will fail in their function if they allow themselves to be dictated to by 
governments. 
Of course, universities do have responsibilities to the national 
interest. For example, criticising a nation (or a state) because it has ir­
rational drug laws, racist or sexist institutional policies, or short 
sighted environmental policies, are all in the national interest. I ob­
serve that none of these are matters of economic interest (indeed, 
they may run against economic interest). I take this opportunity to la­
ment the fact that the phrase "national interest" has been hijacked 
,by politicians and their bureaucrats to mean "economic interest"; a 
9 
fact that social critics would do well to stress. Interests far outrun, 
and often outweigh, purely economic interests. 
Still, universities have some responsiblities to the national econo­
mic interests too (as the government never tires of telling us). Tax 
payers have the right to expect some sort of economic return for their 
money. Here, at least, we appear to have found an area of university 
function in which philosophy is relatively unimportant. Have we? 
No. This is for two reasons. The first is that the training of philo­
sophy students makes them high-level contributors in employment, 
as a couple of recent reports show. The first is by the British Royal In­
stitute of Philosophy (Philosophy Graduates and Jobs, 1986) and 
demonstrates that philosophy graduates may take longer to settle 
into a profession than other graduates, being more discriminating, 
but within a couple of years of graduation their level of employment 
is high compaired with other non-professional graduates. Philosophy 
graduates also report an unusually high level of job-satisfaction. The 
second report is by the Study Group on the Conditions of Excellence 
in American Higher Education (The Standardized Test Scores of 
College Graduates, 1954-1982, 1985), which reports that philosophy 
majors perform substantially better than average on each of the 
standard tests for admission to graduate schools, and that not a single 
other group of majors shows such a consistently high achievement 
pattern. This demonstrates that philosophy majors have the highest 
level of those general skills sought after by American employers: the 
ability to think rigourously, express oneself clearly, analyse situations 
and arguments, and come up with creative solutions to problems. 
The second reason philosophy is important to economic interests 
is that, although research in philosophy rarely provides short term 
money makers, it may have important and unforeseen economic con­
sequences further down the track. For example, the theoretical basis 
of computing was worked out by logicians such as Goede! and 
Church before the first electronic computer was even thought of. 
And the philosophical speculations of Niels Bohr about the nature of 
matter eventually made the transistor and the microchip possible. 
Right now, the traditional philosophical subject of epistemology is 
finding applications in artificial intelligence that were not dreamed of 
twenty years ago. Thus, even where you might least expect it, philo­
sophy plays a crucial role in the functioning and responsibility of uni­
versities. 
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I end this section with an aside. As we have seen, there are import­
ant reasons why the responsibilities of a university differ inherently 
from those of a government, particularly those of a government with 
an eye on the next election. It is, therefore, crucial that those running 
our universities bear this firmly in mind when determining policy and 
practice in the light of governmental economic pressure. They must 
realise that what i-s in the best short term economic interest of their 
own particular university may not be in the best interest of the uni­
versity system, or the economy as a whole, as studies of coordination 
problems show. For example, if each vice chancellor decides to max­
imise government funding of his or her own institution by developing 
those areas nominated as short-term priority areas, the result on a 
national level will be a general and unintended atrophy of other areas 
- such as philosophy - essential both to the university system as a
whole and to long-term economic development.
The officers of our universities need to be clear, courageous and 
work cooperatively. They also require the support and solidarity of 
all university staff. This is something that the government appears to 
appreciate, since it has taken steps to destroy it with the familiar 
strategy off divide and conquer. Their actions have aimed to disman­
tle the collegial structure of universities and to replace it with the 
divisive, hierarchical, and quite inappropriate corporate structure. I 
say again, the universities have a responsibility that far outruns the 
parochial short-term interests of any particular national government. 
If we do not stand up for this, collectively and determinedly, the 
result will be the sale of our birthright for a mess of pottage. 
III The Nature of Philosophy: 
Philosophy as Self-reflexive 
Having sounded the tocsin - and perhaps with some sense of anti­
climax - I leave my discussion of the role of philosophy in a univers­
ity, and return to the question of the nature of philosophy itself. 
Earlier, I examined a number of possible definitions of philosophy 
and rejected them as inadequate. Let us make a fresh start. How 
should one define something? A standard answer, going back as far 
as Plato, is that one should proceed by the method of genus and dif­
ferentia. We first say what kind of thing something is (give it genus); 
we then say what species of this kind it is by giving a differentia, 
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something which differentiates it from other species of the same 
genus. Let us proceed thus. 
Fairly clearly, philosophy is a kind of inquiry, or better, theoreti­
cal inquiry, since philosophy goes beyond mere fact-collection: it 
formulates and evaluates theories about many kinds of things. But 
what kind of theoretical inquiry is it? What differentiates it from 
other such inquiries? That is the question. 
The key to an answer has already passed before us. I have been dis­
cussing the nature of philosophy. In doing this I have myself been 
doing philosophy, for the nature of philosophy is itself a philosophi­
cal issue. In this, philosophy would seem quite unique. The nature of, 
mathematics is not itself a mathematical issue; in fact, it is a 
philosophical one. The nature of history is not an historical one; it, 
too, is a philosophical issue. As far as I can see, there is no inquiry, 
other than philosophy, discussion of the nature of which falls within 
the scope of that inquiry. This, then, is the dijferentia I suggest. Let 
us call an inquiry the nature of which falls within its own scope selj­
reflexive. I suggest that philosophy is that theoretical inquiry which is 
self-reflexive. 
The main doubt, it seems to me, about the adequacy of this defini­
tion is that self-refexivity, whilst it may state an essential property of 
philosophy, does not state a fundamental one. For example, it may 
be admitted that philosophy is self-reflexive, but argued that this is so 
only because philosophy has the more fundamental property of being 
the subject that discusses the nature of all theoretical inquiries. 
It may be the case that philosophy studies the nature of all the­
oretical inquiries, though I doubt this. (For example, the nature of 
entomology hardly seems a philosophical issue; it hardly seems an 
issue at all.) However, I take the general point: a definition must pick 
out not just an essential property �f something but, in some sense, a 
fundamental essential property and the dijferentia I have suggested 
does not appear to be very fundamental. 
What does it mean to say that a dijjerentia is fundamental? Con­
sider again the definition of gold as the element with atomic number 
79. What makes atomic number a good dijferentia is that it is the es­
sential property from which a substance's other properties follow.
Once we know the atomic number of an element we can determine,
given the appropriate background theory, its chemical properties,
such as valency, and even many of its physical properties, such as
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melting point. Now it seems to me that self-reflexivity is a fundamen­
tal property of philosophy in just this sense. For from it one can infer 
numerous other features of philosophy, including the ones I flagged 
in Part I. This I shall now argue. 
Suppose that an inquiry is self-reflexive. Then prior to the inquiry 
we have no independent fix on the nature of its object. But if we have 
no such fix, we have no fix on either the fundamental assumptions or 
the special methods of the inquiry. (One can know the appropriate 
methods for investigating something only when one has a pretty good 
idea of what it is.) In other words, a self-reflexive inquiry must boot­
strap itself into existence, both in terms of its objects and its methods. 
But just this is true of philosophy, as we have seen to be the case [4]. 
All other inquiries - science or history or anthropology - proceed 
against a background of shared assumptions, just because the subject 
is constituted as a special science with determinate shape. Philosophy 
is not constituted in this way. 
Moreover, the lack of doctrinal and particular methodological 
constraints in philosophy explains why it is the imaginative subject it 
is, where any hypothesis may be seriously put up [2]. Conversely, 
since its only way of controlling unbridled speculation is criticism 
(which is not a special method but something common to all forms of 
inquiry), this explains why the critical aspects of philosophy are so 
well developed [l]. Finally, it now becomes clear why other dis­
ciplines broke away from philosophy [3]. One thing that can result 
from philosophical inquiry is the basic assumptions and appropriate 
methods for investigating some subject (these must, after all, come 
from somewhere)\ When these are found they constitute a new sub­
ject, which then divorces itself from philosophy. 
Thus we see that the self-reflexive nature of philosophy explains a 
number of its features: its lack of special method and assumptions; its 
creativity; its critical nature; and its historical fecundity. Hence it 
seems very appropriate to take self-reflexivity to be a quite 
fundamental property of philosophy. This justifies defining philo­
sophy as that inquiry that is self-reflexive. 
Conclusion: The importance of examples 
When all this is said and done, there remains the point that this 
definition is not very useful in determining whether a question is 
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philosophical or not. This I concede. Though some have thought that 
this is an essential condition for a definition, the thought is mistaken. 
A definition of truth as correspondence with reality - though it may 
be perfectly correct when suitably fleshed out - is similarly useless 
for determining whether something is true. And the definition of gold 
as something with atomic number 79 is of little use in determining 
whether something is gold; the bank of familiar practical tests is 
much more useful. If you wish to know whether or not something is 
a philosophical question, there is no better way than to see whether 
you find yourself doing philosophy when considering it. (The experi­
ence is quite unmistakable.) And the only way to learn what this is 
like is to get used to doing it with examples. That is why giving ex­
amples is, I think, the most effective way of getting someone to un­
derstand what philosophy is. So perhaps I'll stick to that at parties. 
I finish with reference to the quotation from Aristotle which starts 
the paper: 
Perfect thought apprehends and thinks its object in such a way 
that the thought and its object become one, and the thought thus 
becomes its own object. 
Those who know their Aristotle will recognise that in this quota­
tion Aristotle takes himself to be talking about God. I think he is 
wrong. He is, in fact, describing philosophy. 
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